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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Proposition 28, the Legislative Term Limits Reform Act, 1 is a constitutional amendment
proposed by “Californians for a Fresh Start.” 2 The proposition would amend the current term
limit rules as applied to California senators and assemblymembers. 3 The current term limit rules
were established in 1990 under Proposition 140 and limit the number of terms that state
representatives may serve in their respective branch. 4 Currently, members of the California State
Assembly are limited to three two-year terms and members of the California State Senate are
limited to two four-year terms. 5 Under this system, a legislator can serve a maximum of fourteen
years in the Capitol. 6
Proposition 28 replaces the separate eight and six-year term limits on future state senators and
assemblymembers, respectively, with a twelve-year limit that can be served in either the Senate,
the Assembly, or a combination of both. 7 If approved, these constitutional changes will only
apply to those legislators first elected after the passage of the measure. 8 Legislators elected
before the measure is passed will continue to be subject to existing term limits. 9
A “yes” vote on Proposition 28 will reduce the total number of years a California legislator can
serve in the state legislature from fourteen years to twelve years. 10 However, it would permit
legislators to serve these twelve years in either the California State Senate, the California State
Assembly, or a combination of both. 11 A “no” vote means that the current law, which limits
California assemblymembers to three two-year terms and California senators to two four-year
terms, will remain in place. 12
II. BACKGROUND AND EXISTING LAW
a. Proposition 140
In 1990, voters passed Proposition 140 enacting the current term limit laws through a
constitutional initiative.13 Under the proposition, California voters limited assemblymember
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service to six years (three two-year terms) and senator service to eight years (two four-year
terms). 14 The law also banned legislators from returning to the Senate or Assembly once their
respective limits have been reached. 15
b. Initiatives Addressing Term Limits Since Proposition 140
Since the enactment of Proposition 140, reformers have attempted to pass two other ballot
measures. Both initiatives, Proposition 45 in 2002 and Proposition 93 in 2008, failed.
Proposition 45 (2002)
Proposition 45 would have allowed state legislators to run for re-election and serve for four years
beyond the limits allowed by Proposition 140. 16 If passed, registered voters in legislative districts
could submit petition signatures that would have allowed their current legislator to serve above
the maximum allowed by Proposition 140.17 Voters could exercise this option only once per
legislator in the district they most recently served. 18 Proposition 45 lost with 57.7% of voters
opposed. 19
Proposition 93 (2008)
Proposition 93 would have allowed state legislators to remain up to twelve years in their current
chamber. 20 The twelve-year period was longer than the period allowed under Proposition 140 for
a representative’s respective house, but two years shorter than the total time allowed in the
legislature.
Proposition 93 was very similar to the current Proposition 28 proposal. Like Proposition 28,
Proposition 93 would have allowed a legislator to serve twelve consecutive years in the house to
which they were elected and reduced the total amount of time a person may serve in the state
legislature from fourteen years to twelve years. 21 However, Proposition 93 did not take into
account the prior years of service—in either house—that the legislator had already served. 22
Consequently, voters saw the law as self-serving for the legislators already sitting in the
Assembly and Senate because they would have been able to serve more years than their
predecessors. 23 As a result of the “disingenuous gambit by some of the state's most powerful
elected officials to retain control and extend their longevity,” many voters were not persuaded by
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this attempt to reform term limits.24 Although the margin was closer than Proposition 45,
Proposition 93 still lost with 53.6% of voters opposed. 25
III. ROAD TO THE BALLOT
As noted above, “Californians for a Fresh Start” sponsored Proposition 45. The group is a
coalition of both Southern California business and labor interests that includes the Los Angeles
County Federation of Labor and the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. 26 The proponents hired
Kimball Petition Management (KPM) to collect signatures. KPM received $1,424,087 for their
work. 27 The proponents hoped to qualify the measure for the November 2010 ballot, but were
unable to validate the qualifying amount of signatures required in time. 28 As a result, the measure
was moved to the next statewide election.
According to Los Angeles Times reporter Patrick McGreevy, the impetus behind Proposition 28
stems from a state legislative exemption given to a Southern Californian real estate developer. 29
In September of 2009, the legislature granted Majestic Realty (headed by billionaire Ed Roski) a
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) exemption to build a new football stadium for a
future Los Angeles team. 30 Two months after the exemption was granted, Majestic Realty made
the first major contribution to Californians for a Fresh Start. 31 Majestic Realty donated $300,000,
which was likely used to collect the 694,000 signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot. 32
Ronni Levine, leader of the group Citizens Against the Stadium, said Proposition 28 was “a way
of returning a favor” for the football stadium’s legislative environmental exemption. 33 However,
Mr. Levine’s “back scratching” argument fails to recognize that the proposition does not benefit
current legislators. 34 California’s current serving legislators must carry out their terms under the
limits set in Proposition 140. 35
As of March 30, 2011, Californians for a Fresh Start has raised $2,101,918.00. 36 These donations
have come primarily from Southern California business interests. 37
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW
Proposition 28 would amend Section 2 of Article IV of the California Constitution. 38 It would
add the language “during her or his lifetime a person may serve no more than 12 years in the
Senate, the Assembly, or both, in any combination of terms.” 39 This lifetime ban is similar to the
current lifetime ban imposed on legislators after they have served fourteen years in the Capitol 40
This subdivision will only apply to those members of the Senate or the Assembly who are elected
to the legislature for the first time after the effective date of his subdivision. 41 Members of the
Senate or Assembly elected before the effective date of Proposition 28 may only serve the
number of terms allowed at the time of their last election. 42
V. FISCAL IMPACT
According to the California Secretary of State, Proposition 28 has no direct fiscal effect on state
or local governments. 43
VI. CONSTITUIONAL ISSUES
The constitutionality of California’s legislative term limit system, under Proposition 140, has
been challenged twice. In both instances, courts upheld the constitutionality of the term limit
system.
In Legislature v. Eu, 44 less than a year after Proposition 140 passed, the state legislature and
several individual legislators challenged the constitutionality of Proposition 140's term limits
under a petition for writ of mandate to the California Supreme Court. Among other post-election
challenges to the legitimacy of Proposition 140, the petitioners argued that the proposition’s
lifetime ban (after the maximum number of terms are served) substantially burdens two
fundamental rights under the United States Constitution: the right to vote and the right to be a
candidate for public office. 45 Using a rational basis test, the California Supreme Court held, “the
interests of the state in incumbency reform outweigh any injury to incumbent officeholders and
those who would vote for them.” 46 Thus, Proposition 140's term limit system did not violate the
plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights. 47
The 9th Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of Proposition 140 nine years later in Bates v.
Jones. 48 Bates, a termed-out assemblymember, sued in federal court to have the provisions of
Proposition 140 declared unconstitutional based on his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 49
38
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The district court agreed with his claim, but the 9th Circuit overturned the decision, keeping the
limits in place. 50 On balance, the court found minimal impact on the legislator’s rights compared
to the legitimate state interest in incumbency reform. 51
It is unlikely a court will find the constitutional rights at stake under Proposition 28 any greater
than those in Eu or Bates because of the minimal difference in the amount of years a legislator
can serve under Proposition 140 compared with Proposition 28. Because California has a
legitimate interest in incumbency reform, Proposition 28 is likely to pass constitutional muster.
VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
a. Proponents
The current term limit structure under Proposition 140 has resulted in frequent changes in the
membership and the leadership of legislative committees. 52 The system has been analogized to
“musical chairs,” as each newly elected California legislators starts “plotting to capture their next
office even before they're sworn in to the one they've just won.” 53 Further, because members of
the Assembly have only six years before a lifetime ban goes into effect, Assembly Speakers have
less than two years to leave their mark. 54
These lame duck leaders face serious obstacles, as term limits diminish a leader’s ability to
discipline another member’s failure to compromise. 55 Former Sacramento Bee columnist Peter
Schrag believes that term limits “created a [l]egislature that has neither an institutional memory
nor members who can expect to be rewarded for long-term success, and thus, with rare
exceptions, lack any motivation for leadership or inclination to sacrifice and compromise in the
present.” 56
Proponents argue that the current term limit structure has resulted in diminished expertise in
significant policy areas. 57 Seemingly, lobbyists, special interests, and state bureaucrats now
dominate the legislative process because of their superior knowledge of the legislative system
compared with current legislators. 58 These "Sacramento mainstays" remain in the Capitol long
50
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after termed-out legislators leave. 59 The lack of expertise has been felt in the committees, where
chairs of key committees have limited legislative experience before moving into these important
positions.60
Proposition 28 aims to address these issues by allowing legislators to serve more time in one
house. 61 Ideally, this will motivate legislators to serve longer in their current house because of
increased opportunities for senior positions within their party and caucuses, and greater choice of
committee service. 62 These changes will benefit the legislature by providing members with a
more thorough institutional knowledge of their respective house and committees, resulting in
more effective and efficient policymaking. 63
Additionally, Proposition 28 will also guard against current legislators using the measure to
extend their total service in the Capitol greater than that allowed by the current rules, as the
proposition only applies to legislators first-elected after the measure is enacted. 64 This was a
major concern for voters in 2008 regarding the unsuccessful Proposition 93. 65
b. Opponents
Groups on both sides of the term limits debate have expressed concerns about Proposition 28:
Advocates of term limits are unhappy with the proposition’s looser restrictions and opponents of
term limits argue the measure does not go far enough.
U.S. Term Limits, a national group promoting term limits, has been one of only a few parties to
publicly oppose Proposition 28. 66 This group and other critics point to two main problems with
Proposition 28: the ballot title is misleading and the re-election rates of incumbents "would
skyrocket." 67
Proposition 28’s ballot title reads: “LIMITS ON LEGISLATOR’S TERMS IN OFFICE.” 68
Critics argue that the title is misleading because Proposition 28 allows assemblymembers to
serve in the Assembly for twelve years, not the six-year maximum permitted under the current
59
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http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/time-end-term-limits.
60
Assemblymember Bob Blumenfield, Budget Committee Chair, had no legislative experience when appointed;
Assemblymember Felipe Fuentes, Appropriations Committee Chair, had three years experience when appointed;
Assemblymember Nancy Skinner, Rules Committee Chair, had two years experience when appointed. See CAL.
STATE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEES, http://assembly.ca.gov/committees (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). Senator Christine
Kehoe, Appropriations Committee Chair, had five years experience when appointed; Senator Mark Leno, Budget
and Fiscal Review Committee Chair, had three years experience when appointed; Senator Darrell Steinburg,
Rules Committee Chair, had two years experience when appointed. See CAL. STATE SENATE COMMITTEES,
http://assembly.ca.gov/committees (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). Readers should note that some of these legislators
did have previous experience in another house.
61
Fresh Start, supra note 2.
62
How Have Term Limits Affected the California Legislature?, supra note 52.
63
Id.
64
Fresh Start, supra note 2.
65
See supra text accompanying notes 9–11.
66
The Republican Party came out against the measure as well. See Torey Van Oot, California Republican Party
Endorses Auto Rate Initiative, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 26, 2012,
http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2012/02/california-republican-party-endorses-auto-rate-initiative.html.
67
CA Democratic Convention Wraps up Downtown, CBS8.COM, Feb. 12, 2012,
http://www.cbs8.com/story/16918993/ca-democratic-convention-wraps-up-downtown.
68
Text of Proposition 28, supra note 1 (caps included).

system. 69 In this case, an assemblymembers’ stay in office will actually be doubled, instead of
reduced. A newly elected state senator’s time in office would also be extended under Proposition
28 to twelve years, as opposed to the eight years currently allowed.
Also, legislators who would ordinarily be termed out of office in one house under the current
system could benefit from Proposition 28 because they would not need to change houses and
could remain in their same districts for longer. 70 For example, a state assemblyman who has
reached the six-year limit under the current system would need to run for a Senate seat (that is
open or filled by an incumbent) if they wanted to remain in the Capitol. In doing so, that
assemblyman must run a competitive election race in a larger district with an unfamiliar voter
base. 71 As a result, the former assemblyman would likely have a more difficult time seeking
election to the Senate. 72
Other opponents argue that Proposition 28 doesn’t go far enough to repair the damage done
under the current system. As the non-partisan group Center for Governmental Studies
recommends, “the life-time ban on allowing termed out members to return to the legislature
[should] be eliminated, and . . . termed out members [should] be allowed to run for office again
after passage of a reasonable period of time (e.g. four years).” 73
VIII. CONCLUSION
If California voters pass Proposition 28, the maximum time a California legislator can serve in
the state legislature will be reduced from fourteen years to twelve years. 74 A legislator can serve
these years in either the California State Senate, the California State Assembly, or a combination
of both. 75 Proponents claim that by approving this proposition, the frequent changes in the
membership and leadership of legislative committees will decrease. 76 Thus, legislators will gain
expertise in significant policy areas, as well as a greater institutional knowledge within their
respective house. 77 However, opponents argue that the ballot title is misleading and legislators
could benefit from Proposition 28 by allowing them to stay in one house and remain in their
districts for longer. 78 If Proposition 28 fails, the current law limiting assemblymembers to three
two-year terms and senators to two four-year terms will remain in place.
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